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Abstract 
Taking into account a recent decree enacted by the Catalan government 
stipulating the procedure to provide information on a person’s biological roots, 
this article examines the tension between the anonymity of the gamete donor 
and the child’s right to know their origin. The analysis of legal systems that 
recognise this right for children conceived through donated gametes spurs us 
to further examine the hypotheses, quite widespread today, which consider 
traditional arguments for secrecy outdated. In this regard, the article also 
challenges the different treatment granted to adopted children and donor 
gamete children by legal systems such as Spain’s. Beyond the possible 
conflicting rights of children, donors and parents, arguments provided by 
anonymity supporters, such as the moral damage resulting from disclosure or 
the possible link between disclosure and a decrease in the number of donors, 
should be also taken into account. However, these arguments require absolute 
empirical evidence, which is not currently conclusive. Alternatively, disclosure 
of the donor’s identity is consistent with the needs of donor families and with a 
major trend in family law supporting the right to know one’s genetic origin, 
dissociated from biological and legal parentage.  
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1. Introduction 
On the 11th of June 2014, the plenary session of the Bioethics Committee of 
Catalonia (CBD) approved a proposal from a multidisciplinary working group 
whose mission was to draft a reflection on the draft decree stipulating the 
procedure to provide knowledge on a person’s biological roots; this effort has 
given rise to Decree 169/2015 dated the 21st of July 2015, which establishes the 
procedure to provide information on biological origins (DOGC no. 6919 dated 
23rd of July 2015). Because of issues involving competences, the decree only 
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stipulates this right for adoptees, since donor anonymity is the general rule in 
Spain regarding people conceived with assisted reproduction techniques (ART) 
(article 5.5 of Law 14/2006 on Human Assisted Reproduction Techniques, 
dated 26 May 2006 [abbreviated LTRHA]), and the Catalan Parliament does not 
have authority over this matter (1st final provision of the LTRHA). In practice, 
this limitation confers a more restricted scope on article 30.2 of Law 14/2010 on 
the Rights and Opportunities of Children and Adolescents, dated 27 May 2010 
(abbreviated LDOIA) than what stems from its literal reading, according to 
which “children and adolescents have the right to know their genetic origin, 
biological parents and biological relatives”. 
In the current legislative context, the joint interpretation of the LTRHA 
and the Catalan Civil Code (CCC) leads us to equate genetics and biology; 
however, it is telling that the aforementioned art 30.2 of the LDOIA contrasts 
the two terms, indicating that they are not identical. Thus, for example, genetics 
and biology may be dissociated in surrogate pregnancy, such as in partial 
surrogate pregnancy, when one woman provides the egg(s) to be fertilised while 
another brings the pregnancy to term. Something similar might occur in 
heterosexual couples who use heterologous fertilisation with donated eggs, or in 
couples comprised of two women, in which the reception of oocytes from 
partner (ROPA) technique is used to impregnate one of the two with embryo(s) 
created from the egg(s) of the other and donated sperm. In both cases, the two 
women who take part in the process play a biological role, but only one of them 
plays a genetic role by providing the gametes. With the exception of couples 
with two women, in which the maternal relationship can be proven with both 
partners (article 235-8.1 and 235-13.1 of the CCC), in other cases the maternal 
relationship is governed, genetics aside, by the principle of Roman law which 
states that motherhood is determined by the biological fact of birth (article 235-
3 of the CCC). Given that article 30.2 mentions both biology and genetics, at 
least hypothetically we could question whether the Catalan lawmakers’ choice 
reflects a voluntary decision to expand the right to know one’s origins to the 
sphere of ART. 
This interpretation would be coherent with the biology-driven system 
that has traditionally inspired Catalan law on issues of parentage (Alegret, 2014: 
618-620). For this reason, despite its limited authority, the group created within 
the CBD aims to reflect on the possible existence and consequences of a right to 
know one’s origins not only in the sphere of adoption, both national and 
international, but also in cases of heterologous ART with donated gametes. In 
this article, I shall focus on the scope of the law in this latter case. 
According to Spanish laws on ART, the information on the donor that the 
child conceived through ART may obtain is generally restricted to very basic 
data, and revealing the donor’s identity is limited to extraordinary 
circumstances which entail a certain danger of the child’s death or health, or 
when this information is needed according to criminal trial law, whenever it is 
absolutely indispensable (article 5.5 of the LTRHA). The main issue sparked by 
this law stems from its conflict with a possible right to know one’s origins which, 
if it does exist, would render the law devoid of content. My working hypothesis 
assumes that the recognition of this right only for adoptees places those who 
were conceived through donated gametes on a lower rung. In my opinion, we 
cannot ignore the fact that the result of a successful ART procedure is the birth 
of a person with the same rights as a person conceived any other way. 
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At a time like now, when more and more families are based on affect and 
a non-biological conception of parentage, it may be surprising that there are 
claims for the right to know one’s origins. The reason for these claims is twofold: 
first, this is each individual’s personal choice which must be respected if they 
choose to exercise it once they are legally of age; and secondly, when using ART, 
this information is already available to third parties and is therefore accessible. 
 
2. Recent data 
According to the data published by the Department of Health of the Generalitat 
de Catalunya, 54.5% of the IVF-ICSI procedures carried out in 2011 were 
performed with donated eggs and 15.4% were performed with donated sperm 
(Fivcat.net, 2014: 16). However, the figures from semen banks show a rise in the 
number of donors in both artificial insemination procedures and in-vitro 
techniques (Fivcat.net, 2014: 7). 
The statistics do not reflect the cases in which the person who uses ART 
is a single woman or a couple with two women, who necessarily require an 
anonymous donor. We do, however, have data on the United Kingdom, where 
this group already accounts for one-third of all ART recipients. In the UK, too, it 
is estimated that one out of every ten fresh IVF procedures uses donated 
gametes or embryos, and that the number of donors of both sperm and eggs has 
been on the rise since 2005 (HFEA 2014: 8). Of all the British couples who used 
heterologous IVF between 2012 and 2013, 39% did so with donated sperm, 59% 
with donated eggs and 3% with donated eggs and sperm or embryos (HFEA 
2014: 19-20). 
Among the supporters of maintaining the rule of donor anonymity, there 
is some concern that the abolition of this rule might trigger a decline in 
donations, and thus in the practice of ART, with the obvious repercussions this 
might have on what has been described as a “business” (Igareda, 2014: 239). 
Despite this, in the United Kingdom the Nuffield report reveals that the 
legislative change that took place there in 2004 has not stopped donors from 
donating (2013: 54 and forward). In October 2014, the executive director of the 
National Gamete Donor Bank confirmed these figures, specifically that in the 
ten years that have elapsed since the enactment of the new law, not only have 
there been more donors, but the donors are becoming younger, which has led to 
higher ART success rates (http://www.hfea.gov.uk/9386.html). 
While there are few studies on the attitudes of persons conceived with 
donated gametes, and the studies that do exist largely focus on those who were 
conceived with donated sperm, it is claimed that the most commonly sought 
information revolves around the personal characteristics of the donor, their 
reasons for donating, their possible shared traits and their health history 
(Nuffield, 2013: 54 and forward). 
Regarding the impact of this information, recent studies corroborate 
what previous information noted: both families that reveal the method of 
conception and those that do not work well until early adolescence. However, 
the discovery of this origin in adulthood or by third parties has significantly 
negative effects. Likewise, parents who tell children about their origins rarely 
regret this decision, while the same cannot be said of parents who do not, some 
of whom perceive the “secret” as a burden (Nuffield, 2013: 54 and forward). 
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3. Brief comparative study 
In recent years, many countries have evolved from an anonymous donation 
system to one that is more flexible and transparent (Schwenzer, 2007: 9-11). 
Today, between 20% and 36% of the sixty countries analysed in a study by the 
International Federation of Fertility Societies (IFFS) no longer have a system 
based on donor anonymity. Of these, 36% allow identifying information on the 
donor to be accessed, 24% allow non-identifying information and between 24% 
and 36% do not distinguish whether this information is identifying or not (IFFS, 
2013: 74). 
Many European countries have adopted the policy launched by Sweden 
in 1984 and followed by Austria in 1992, which allows the person conceived via 
donated gametes to access identifying information on the donor once they are 
mature enough. This also applies in Switzerland (with a 1998 law which has 
been in force since 2001), Norway (2003), Holland (with a 2002 law which has 
been in force since 2004), the United Kingdom (2004), Finland (2006). Outside 
Europe, worth noting are the laws in the Australian state of Victoria (1995), 
Western Australia and New Zealand (2004), New South Wales (2007), Southern 
Australia (2010), Uruguay (2013) and Argentina, where the new Código civil y 
comercial de la nación (Civil and Commercial Code of the Nation), approved by 
Law 26,994 dated the 1st of October 2014, also recognises this right. Other legal 
systems have chosen a double-track system, which allows the donors and the 
users of ART to choose between the anonymous or identifiable donation track 
(in favour of their adoption, given that this allows for a better balance between 
the rights involved; Pennings, 1997: 2839-2844). In 1996, Iceland chose this 
model, which is the preferred one in many US states (Cohen, 2014: 31-37). 
One common denominator among all the laws that allow the donor to be 
identified is the dissociation between knowledge of genetic parentage and the 
establishment of legal parentage. This is provided for in Spanish ART law for 
the few exceptions to the general rule of anonymity (article 8.3 of the LTRHA), 
and it is generally provided for in the case of adoption (article 180.4 of the 
Spanish Civil Code [CC] and 235-49.2 of the CCC). 
The general rule of donor anonymity is also being called into question, 
with a few nuances, in the numerous recent official reports, such as France’s 
Filiation, origines, parentalité, written by a working group presided over by the 
sociologist Irène Théry. The report concludes that the Civil Registry should 
allow children who are legally of age to learn the way they were conceived (2014: 
213, 230 and forward). However, the report suggests revealing the identity only 
when there is a previous request by a legally adult child and consent of the 
donor (320), in that it claims that anonymity is not incompatible with the right 
to a private and family life recognised in the European Human Rights 
Convention (63-64). In Australia, the general trend in favour of the possibility of 
knowing the gamete donor is captured in the Senate report entitled Donor 
Conception Practices in Australia, which recommends banning anonymity in 
donations and providing compulsory counselling, especially targeted at parents’ 
revealing to the child the origin of their conception in order to prevent the latter 
from having identity issues (2011: 11 and 15). The report recommends that the 
child be able to access non-identifying information on the donor after the age of 
16 and identifying information after the age of 18 (95), and it bases the right to 
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know donors on medical reasons, on getting important information on lowering 
the risk of relations between relatives, on establishing relationships with donors 
and half-siblings, and on access to a more complete notion of identity (80). 
 
4. The right to know one’s origins 
Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognises the child’s right 
“to know their parents… to the extent possible”, as well as the member states’ 
obligation to ensure the effectiveness of these rights according to their national 
laws and specific obligations stemming from international agreements on this 
matter. In 2002, the UN’s Committee on the Rights of the Child, aware that 
children who were born out of wedlock in the United Kingdom or who were 
adopted or conceived through ART did not have the right to know the identity of 
their biological parents, recommended, based on article 7 in relation to the 
higher interest of the minor (article 3), that all the member states take all the 
necessary measures “to allow all children, irrespective of the circumstances of 
their birth, and adopted children to obtain information on the identity of their 
parents, to the extent possible” (Concluding Observations, recommendations 31 
and 32, CRC/C/15/Add.188, 8). 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has never handed down a 
decision on the scope of the right of persons conceived through ART to know 
their origins. However, it has ruled on minors under the guardianship of a 
public administration and adopted children (Gaskin v. United Kingdom, 
7.7.1989; Odièvre v. France, 13.2.2003, and Godelli v. Italy, 25.9.2012), and to 
justify the provenance of actions and claims to non-marital paternity (Mikulic v. 
Croatia, 7.2.2002), even beyond the statutes of limitations for these actions 
stipulated by the national laws (Jäggi v. Switzerland, 13.7.2006 and Backlund 
v. Finland, 6.7.2010). Based on all of these cases, we can infer that the right to 
know one’s origins is an essential right in the development of an individual’s 
identity, which does not necessarily have to evolve towards a legal bond of 
parentage with the parent(s), and which is part of the right to private life 
recognised in article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
There is an increasing number of voices in favour of recognising this right 
within the context of ART, in that the traditional justifications of maintaining 
secrecy have gradually lost value (Blauwhoff, 2009: 10-11, 341 and forward; 
Cahn, 2009: 127). The evolution towards a system in which the identity of the 
donor is open is the outcome of a new focus on the rights and interests of people 
conceived with donated gametes, which are not viewed as symmetrical to the 
rights of the parents or donors (Cahn, 2014: 1111-1112; Raes, Ravelingien, 
Pennings, 2014; for Spain, vid. Garriga, 2007: 184-186, according to which the 
LTRHA has focused on the interests of the recipients, in contrast to the norms 
that regulate adoption, which revolve around the child’s interests). Ultimately, it 
is claimed that family relationships should be governed by honesty (Garriga, 
2007: 173-174, with citations of numerous studies in the field of psychology; 
Nuffield, 2013: 86 and forward). 
If a rule in favour of abolishing anonymity is chosen, one of the most 
controversial issues is whether the right to know one’s origin’s should be applied 
retroactively, since if there is in fact a subjective right, one should always be able 
to exercise it. On this point, the reports that recommend that anonymity be 
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abolished believe that the right to privacy should be preserved if the donor was 
not informed that the person thus conceived could find out their identity when 
they donated the gamete (Filiation, origines, parentalité 2013: 222 and 233). In 
this sense, the claim is that abolishing anonymity non-retroactively would not 
affect donors’ rights. The report by the Australian Senate stresses that none of 
the four states which have approved laws in favour of the possibility of knowing 
the donor (Victoria, Western Australia, Northern Territory and New South 
Wales) has done so retroactively (2011: 77-78 and 96). The report stresses that 
gamete donation often takes place through a contract between the donor and 
the centre, and that breaking these conditions could lead donors to file requests 
for monetary compensation against the centres or states. In the absence of 
evidence on the legal and ethical implications of abolishing anonymity 
retroactively, the Australian Senate expressed its approval of donors’ right to 
maintain the anonymity that they were guaranteed when they decided to 
donate. However, if we claim that the child thus born has the right to know their 
origins, the justifications based on the non-retroactivity of the provisions that 
guarantee this law become devoid of content. In view of this conflict, perhaps 
the best way to reconcile the different interests involved would be for the legal 
systems to create voluntary registers that only reveal the information if both the 
child and the donor request it, similar to what some of the legal systems that 
have abolished the guarantee of anonymity have done, such as some Australian 
states, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 
 
5. Donor anonymity 
Many of the authors who support maintaining donor anonymity believe that the 
child’s right to know their origins too readily assumes that this recognition may 
bring the child more harm than benefit, and that it enters into conflict with the 
donor’s right to privacy and the right to reproduction (De Melo Martín, 2014: 
28-35). The field of psychology notes that it is beneficial for children to grow up 
feeling like they are part of a family (cited by Garriga, 2007: 173-174). It also 
appeals to the importance of parental autonomy when taking decisions that 
affect their children’s wellbeing (De Melo Martín, 2014: 30; Pennings, 2014), 
and it questions the existence of a right to know one’s origins based on the right 
to health (De Melo Martín, 2014: 28-35). Ultimately, those in favour of the 
anonymity rule object to the fact that many people who do not have this 
information do have a clearly delimited identity, and that attaching too much 
importance to genetics is not the best way of guaranteeing the wellbeing of 
families that do not share the same genetic make-up (De Melo Martín, 2014: 
32). 
One of the most frequent objections to the right for children conceived 
with donated gametes to know their origins is that this conflicts with the donor’s 
right to privacy. However, in reproduction with ART, unlike in sexual 
reproduction, the intervention of people outside the reproductive process in 
order to make conception possible breaks the rule of anonymity from the outset 
(Farnós, 2014: 112-115). Yet in this conflict of rights, the right of the child must 
prevail, since even though medical information is confidential, the matter shifts 
once a person is born (Garriga, 2007: 179-180, 2014: 777). Regarding the 
argument that abolishing donor anonymity may violate the right to 
reproduction in that it might lower the number of donations, in addition to the 
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fact that there is no empirical evidence to support this claim (see section 2), a 
more transparent policy would only affect reproduction stemming from 
heterologous ART. What is more, ultimately a system in which the donor 
decides whether or not they want to be identified would continue to respect all 
the rights involved. 
 
6. Weak points of Spanish law on assisted reproduction techniques 
The possibility of learning the donor’s identity (article 5.5 of the LTRHA), 
already exceptional in Spanish law, is even further restricted if we bear in mind 
that the origin of parentage cannot be recorded in the Civil Registry (article 7.2 
of the LTRHA). In consequence, if the parents say nothing to the child about the 
origin of their conception, the child has no way of accessing this information 
beyond chance discovery or birth within a homosexual couple. Given the 
uncertainty entailed in leaving the supply of this information in the parents’ 
hands (Golombok et al., 2002: 830-840), it is advisable to have a system in 
place that provides for a record of the origin of the birth. This uncertainty might 
be eliminated by guaranteeing that the origin of the conception is recorded in 
the Civil Registry, as it is in cases of adoption, where the information on the 
adoptee and the original parentage are under a system of restricted public 
access (article 21 and 22 on the Civil Registry Regulation [RRC]). Likewise, it 
could be recorded on the birth certificate, in line with the provisions of article 
563 of the new Argentine CC, or in a national donor registry, such as the ones in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. The latter may be useful for revealing the 
donor’s identity, although it would be sufficient if the origin of the conception 
appeared in the Civil Registry (Garriga, 2007: 219-221). 
A second aspect of Spanish law on ART that is surprising is that the right 
to know one’s origins is guaranteed to the adoptee but not to the person 
conceived using these techniques. Thus, article 235-49 of the CCC allows 
adoptees who are legally of age to perform actions leading to the discovery of 
their biological parents’ identity without this affecting their adoptive parentage. 
Ever since the law in Book II of the Catalan Civil Code was adopted, this right 
has been complemented by adoptive parents’ obligation to inform the adopted 
child about the adoption (article 235-50). Even though forcible compliance with 
this law does not exist, nor are there legal consequences for failing to comply 
with it or even a means to check compliance with it, its enactment signals yet 
another step in the recognition of the child’s right to information on their own 
origin. This does not affect the parents’ right to personal or family privacy, since 
the law protects the circumstance of the adoption from public knowledge, as it is 
subjected to restricted public access in the Civil Registry (Garriga, 2014: 778-
779). Other regional laws on the protection of minors recognise that the adoptee 
has the right to know their original parentage (Garriga, 2014: 766 and 778). In 
article 180.5 of the CC, based on the reform introduced with Law 54/2007 on 
International Adoption dated the 28th of December 2007, the state lawmakers 
limited themselves to guaranteeing adoptees the right to know “the information 
on their biological origins” either once they are legally of age or through their 
legal representatives when still minors. The scope of this precept was further 
fleshed out by Law 26, 2015 dated the 28th of July 2015, which changed the 
child and adolescent protection system (BOE no. 180 dated 29.7.2015), which 
introduces a new article, 180.5 CC, which states that information on the minor’s 
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origins, especially any information related to “the identity of their parents” must 
be conserved for at least 50 years after the adoption effectively takes place. 
We might think that in the case of adoptees the justification for accessing 
their origins is that there has been a more extensive bond (legal and even 
affective) with the biological family, while in the case of people conceived 
through donated gametes this bond has not existed, plus the child usually has a 
biological bond with one of the people who use ART. In my opinion, the 
objection of prior history, meant in the broad sense beyond mere biology, as a 
distinctive feature among adoptees and people conceived via donated gametes is 
not sufficient justification if we bear in mind that from the standpoint of the 
child’s rights it is difficult to justify why the law denies children conceived via 
assisted reproduction a right that it does grant to adoptees. 
 
7. Final reflections 
Despite the questionable constitutionality of article 5.5 of the LTRHA 
(Pantaleón, 1988: 31-36), the Constitutional Court’s ruling 116/1999 dated the 
17th of June 1999 endorses its counterpart article 5.5 of the 1888 LTRA by 
arguing that when one uses ART the investigation guaranteed by article 39.2 of 
the Spanish Constitution does not have the purpose sought by the Constitution, 
which is the establishment of comprehensive legal bonds of reciprocal rights 
and obligations; that identity can be revealed in the exceptional cases provided 
for by law; and that the donors’ right to privacy must be guaranteed because, 
among other reasons, it is a necessary measure in order to continue practising 
ART. However, the increasing dissociation between the different spheres of 
parentage (Schwenzer, 2007: 11; Singer, 2007: 148), the tendency towards a 
society with families based more on roles than on biology, and a distancing from 
the image of donor-parent are all arguments that suggest that a revision of this 
doctrine is in order today (Puigpelat, 2012: 190-191). 
One study performed in Sweden after the law that allows the donor’s 
identity to be accessed entered into force shows that many people conceived 
through donated gametes are not informed of this by their parents, such that 
anyone who has reason to believe that they were conceived in this way has the 
right to be assisted by the Social Welfare Committee in order to find the 
information available at the centre where the ART was performed (Singer, 
2007: 148). This study reveals that ultimately the possibility that the person 
conceived via donated gametes can learn their origins spotlights the need for a 
deeper and slower social change. Laws guaranteeing these rights are worthless if 
attitudes do not change, in that the state has no means to obligate parents to 
reveal information on the origins of their children (vid. the reference to article 
235-50 of the CCC in the previous section). However, the body of laws, such as 
the codes of good practices that countries like the United Kingdom developed 
just before the reform that abolished anonymity entered into force, play a 
pedagogical role in this context. Once secrecy ceases to be the rule of thumb and 
the laws encourage the recognition of origins, this knowledge becomes 
perceived as positive. 
When the state hinders access to identifying and non-identifying 
information on the donor, it is depriving the child conceived with gametes via 
ART from an important aspect of their individual autonomy: the freedom to 
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choose what meaning they assign to the genetic components of their identity 
(Ravitsky 2014: 36-37). 
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